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Background. Persecutory delusions are a key psychotic experience. A reasoning style known as ‘jumping to conclusions’
(JTC) – limited information gathering before reaching certainty in decision making – has been identiﬁed as a contributory
factor in the occurrence of delusions. The cognitive processes that underpin JTC need to be determined in order to de-
velop effective interventions for delusions. In the current study two alternative perspectives were tested: that JTC par-
tially results from impairment in information-processing capabilities and that JTC is a motivated strategy to avoid
uncertainty.
Method. A group of 123 patients with persistent persecutory delusions completed assessments of JTC (the 60:40 beads
task), IQ, working memory, intolerance of uncertainty, and psychiatric symptoms. Patients showing JTC were compared
with patients not showing JTC.
Results. A total of 30 (24%) patients with delusions showed JTC. There were no differences between patients who did
and did not jump to conclusions in overall psychopathology. Patients who jumped to conclusions had poorer working
memory performance, lower IQ, lower intolerance of uncertainty and lower levels of worry. Working memory and worry
independently predicted the presence of JTC.
Conclusions. Hasty decision making in patients with delusions may partly arise from difﬁculties in keeping information
in mind. Interventions for JTC are likely to beneﬁt from addressing working memory performance, while in vivo tech-
niques for patients with delusions will beneﬁt from limiting the demands on working memory. The study provides little
evidence for a contribution to JTC from top-down motivational beliefs about uncertainty.
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Introduction
Over the past decade there has been notable progress
in understanding the cognitive mechanisms underly-
ing a number of individual psychotic experiences.
The greatest attention has been on delusional beliefs.
A reasoning process repeatedly linked to delusions
has been the presence of jumping to conclusions
(JTC). This data-gathering bias has been found in 30
out of 38 clinical studies (see Garety & Freeman, 1999,
2013). It is hypothesized that a limited data search
leads to a rapid acceptance of implausible ideas,
without consideration of alternative explanations.
Initial evidence indicates that JTC may be a predictor
of delusion persistence (Menon et al. 2008; Dudley
et al. 2013), and, importantly, that reducing the bias
may reduce the delusion (Moritz et al. 2010; Waller
et al. 2011). But what are the cognitive factors that con-
tribute to the occurrence of JTC? In this study we
test two hypotheses. First, JTC may result from
information-processing limitations, as marked by
working memory performance. Second, JTC may be a
motivated strategy used to reduce difﬁculties coping
with uncertainty.
JTC is assessed using ‘the beads task’, an experimen-
tal test originally based upon Bayesian probabilistic in-
ference (Garety et al. 1991; Dudley et al. 1997; Warman
et al. 2007; Lincoln et al. 2010). Participants are shown
two jars varying in the proportion of differently
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coloured beads (e.g. one jar has 60 black beads and
40 yellow beads, the other jar has 40 black beads and
60 yellow beads). The jars are then hidden from view
and the participant is told that the experimenter has
selected one jar. The participant is asked to decide
with certainty which jar has been chosen (e.g. the
mainly black bead jar or the mainly yellow bead jar).
The participant can request to see as many beads,
drawn one by one from the selected jar, as he or she
would like before making a decision. JTC is deﬁned
as deciding after being shown two or fewer beads.
There is an easy version of the task, where the differ-
ence in the proportions of the two colours of bead is
large (80:15), and a more difﬁcult version of the task,
where the two colours are present in proportions
that are almost equal (60:40). About half of patients
with delusions show JTC on the 80:15 beads task and
about one-third on the 60:40 version (Garety &
Freeman, 2013).
Two recent large studies have tested the association
of JTC with neuropsychological functioning. Although
neuropsychological problems have been linked to the
negative rather than the positive symptoms of psy-
chosis (e.g. Ventura et al. 2009), there is a plausible
case for expecting a contribution of working memory
to the beads task – task instructions, two alternative
possibilities, and the previous beads drawn have to
be kept in mind. Garety et al. (2013) tested 126 patients
with delusions, comparing working memory and pre-
morbid intellectual functioning in those patients who
jumped to conclusions with those who did not. There
were no differences between the two groups in pre-
morbid intelligence quotient (IQ) estimated with the
Wechsler Test of Adult Reading (Wechsler, 2001). But
on the 60:40 beads task in particular, there were as-
sociations of JTC with poorer working memory per-
formance. The effect sizes were small to moderate.
Falcone (2013) tested 112 patients with ﬁrst-episode
psychosis. IQ was assessed with ﬁve subtests of the
working memory tasks from the Wechsler Adult
Intelligence Scale III (WAIS-III; Wechsler, 1997).
There were strong associations of JTC with IQ and
working memory. The results of these two large
studies are consistent with a number of earlier initial
reports (e.g. Woodward et al. 2008), including a study
indicating that data gathering may improve when
memory load in the beads task is reduced (Menon
et al. 2006). However, a study with 29 patients with
early psychosis did not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant association
of JTC with verbal working memory (Ormrod et al.
2012). Given the results of the largest studies, there
are increasing grounds to believe that working mem-
ory limitations contribute to the presence of JTC.
An alternative perspective is that JTC is a moti-
vated top-down strategy to forestall the presence of
distressing uncertainty. Rather than dealing with
doubt, and therefore potential confusion, a decision is
rapidly made. A meta-cognitive belief – that uncer-
tainty is to be avoided – could guide the data-gathering
process when a decision is made. A potentially useful
concept here is ‘intolerance of uncertainty’, developed
to understand generalized anxiety disorder (Dugas
et al. 1998). Intolerance of uncertainty is hypothesized
to lead to magniﬁcation of problems in situations of lit-
tle realistic risk, and worry is a person’s misguided at-
tempt to regain control over these magniﬁed threats.
The Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale (IUS) was devel-
oped to assess the concept (Freeston et al. 1994).
Consistent with the idea that JTC is a motivated strat-
egy to reduce the occurrence of distressing uncertainty,
Broome et al. (2007) found higher levels of intolerance
of uncertainty to be associated with less data gathering
in the beads task in a combined high risk of psychosis
(n=35) and non-clinical control (n=23) group.
Nonetheless, the relationship of data gathering
with intolerance of uncertainly may not be straightfor-
ward. In their original scale development report,
Freeston et al. (1994) speculated a potentially reverse
effect: that intolerance of uncertainty may lead to
‘high degrees of evidence before a decision can be
made’. Furthermore, Dudley et al. (2011) found no as-
sociation between JTC and intolerance of uncertainty
in 77 patients recruited from a ﬁrst-episode service.
Similarly, in individuals with eating disorders,
Sternheim et al. (2011) found no association of intoler-
ance of uncertainty with performance on the beads
task. It is also notable that a concept related to intoler-
ance of uncertainty is ‘need for closure’, deﬁned as
‘individuals’ desire for a ﬁrm answer to a question
and an aversion toward ambiguity’ (Kruglanski &
Webster, 1996). However, in a study with 187 patients
with psychosis (Freeman et al. 2006), need for closure
was unrelated to JTC. Although based upon similar
concepts, the standard measures of intolerance of un-
certainty and need for closure show only small to mod-
erate associations (Berenbaum et al. 2008). Intolerance
of uncertainty, and its relationship to JTC, remains to
be tested in a large group of patients with current
delusions.
The aim of the present study was to examine JTC in
patients with delusions in relation to both neuropsy-
chological functioning and intolerance of uncertainty.
It was predicted that JTC would be associated with
poorer working memory, lower IQ and greater intoler-
ance of uncertainty. The association of JTC with work-
ing memory was expected to remain, even when
controlling for levels of intellectual functioning. The as-
sociation of JTC with intolerance of uncertainty was
expected to remain, even when controlling for levels
of worry. Hence information-processing constraints
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and top-down motivations were both expected to con-
tribute to the occurrence of JTC.
Method
Participants
A total of 123 patients with persecutory delusions
completed the JTC task during the baseline assess-
ment (prior to randomization) of a clinical trial
(ISRCTN23197625) (Freeman et al. 2012a). Patients
with persecutory delusions were recruited from two
mental health National Health Service (NHS) Trusts:
Oxford Health NHS Foundation Trust and Southern
Health NHS Foundation Trust. The inclusion criteria
were: a current persecutory delusion as deﬁned by
Freeman & Garety (2000); scoring at least 3 on the
conviction scale of the Psychotic Symptom Rating
Scales (PSYRATS)-delusions scale (i.e. at least 50% con-
viction in the delusion) (Haddock et al. 1999); that the
delusion had persisted for at least 3 months; a diag-
nosis from the treating clinical team of ‘non-affective
psychosis’, including schizophrenia, schizo-affective
disorder and delusional disorder; a clinically signiﬁ-
cant level of worry, as indicated by scores above 44
on the Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ;
Startup & Erickson, 2006); aged between 18 and
65 years; and no changes to medication in the past
month. Only eight patients with persecutory delusions
were excluded from entering the trial because of an
insufﬁcient level of worry as assessed by the PSWQ.
Criteria for exclusion were: a primary diagnosis of
alcohol or substance dependency or personality dis-
order; organic syndrome or learning disability; a com-
mand of spoken English inadequate for engaging in
therapy; and currently having individual cognitive–
behavioural therapy.
Assessments
JTC: the beads task (Dudley et al. 1997; Garety et al. 2005)
Data gathering was assessed with a probabilistic
reasoning task that has been extensively used with
individuals with delusions. Participants are asked to
request as many pieces of evidence (coloured beads)
as they would like before making a decision (from
which of two hidden jars the beads are drawn).
The two jars have beads of two different colours in
opposite ratios. The ratio of beads used in the current
study was 60:40. The key variable is the number of
beads requested before making a decision. Requesting
two or fewer beads is classiﬁed as JTC. A categorical
method of assessing JTC is used to capture the extreme
form of the bias and because the number of draws to
decision is not a normally distributed continuous
scale (the informational value of each additional bead
varies).
WAIS-III (Wechsler, 1997)
Three working memory tasks were used: digit span
forwards (repeating back series of numbers), digit
span backwards (repeating back series of numbers in
reverse), and letter–number sequencing (sorting and
recalling a series of letters and numbers). The demands
on working memory increase across each of these three
tasks. These are the most commonly used working
memory tasks in schizophrenia research (Nuechterlein
et al. 2004).
Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI)
The WASI (Wechsler, 1999) is a standardized short and
reliable measure of intelligence. The vocabulary and
matrix reasoning subtests were used to obtain an esti-
mate of IQ.
IUS
The IUS (Freeston et al. 1994) has 27 items each rated
on a 1 to 5 scale. Higher scores indicate greater levels
of intolerance of uncertainty. There are four subscales
derived from factor analysis (Berenbaum et al. 2008):
desire for predictability (e.g. ‘Unforeseen events upset
me greatly’); a tendency to become paralysed in the
face of uncertainty (e.g. ‘When I am uncertain I can’t
function very well’); distress in the face of uncertainty
(e.g. ‘The ambiguities in life stress me’); and inﬂexible
uncertainty beliefs (e.g. ‘Being uncertain means that
a person is disorganized’). These subscales in the
present study had high levels of internal reliability:
desire for predictability, Cronbach’s α=0.85; uncer-
tainty paralysis, Cronbach’s α=0.85; uncertainty dis-
tress, Cronbach’s α=0.80; inﬂexible certainty beliefs,
Cronbach’s α=0.76.
PSYRATS-delusions
The PSYRATS-delusions (Haddock et al. 1999) is a six-
item multidimensional measure. It assesses the convic-
tion, preoccupation, distress and disruption associated
with delusions. Symptoms over the last week are rated.
Higher scores indicate greater severity. The two asses-
sors in the current study had high inter-rater reliability
(n=20, intra-class correlation coefﬁcient=0.99).
Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS)
The PANSS (Kay, 1991) is a 30-item rating instrument
developed for the assessment of patients with schizo-
phrenia. Symptoms over the last week were rated
(i.e. currently present). Higher scores indicate the
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greater presence of psychiatric symptoms. The two
assessors in the current study had high inter-rater re-
liability (n=20, PANSS total intra-class correlation
coefﬁcient=0.91).
Green et al. Paranoid Thoughts Scale (GPTS)
The GPTS (Green et al. 2008) is a 32-item measure of
paranoid thinking. Part A assesses ideas of reference
(e.g. ‘It was hard to stop thinking about people talking
about me behind my back’) and part B assesses ideas
of persecution (e.g. ‘I was convinced there was a con-
spiracy against me’). Each item is rated on a ﬁve-point
scale. Higher scores indicate greater levels of paranoid
thinking. The scale was completed for the period of the
previous fortnight. The internal reliability of the scale
was high (Cronbach’s α for part A was 0.90, and for
part B it was 0.94).
PSWQ
The PSWQ (Meyer et al. 1990) is the most established
measure of trait worry style and has been used in non-
clinical and clinical populations (for a review, see
Startup & Erickson, 2006). Each of the 16 items is
rated on a ﬁve-point scale. Higher scores indicate
a greater tendency to worry. In the current study
Cronbach’s α for the scale was 0.79.
Perseverative Thinking Questionnaire (PTQ)
The PTQ (Ehring et al. 2011) is a 15-item questionnaire
asking about how a person typically thinks about
negative problems (e.g. ‘The same thoughts keep
going through my mind again and again’), with
each item assessed on a 0 to 4 scale. Higher scores in-
dicate greater levels of repetitive negative thinking.
Cronbach’s α for the scale was 0.92.
Analysis
Analyses were carried out using SPSS (version 20.0, re-
lease 20.0.0; IBM, USA). The patient group was divided
into two: those showing JTC and those who did not.
To test the two primary hypotheses the groups were
then compared using t tests on the measures of work-
ing memory and intolerance of uncertainty. Binary
logistic regressions with JTC as the dependent variable
(0=no JTC, 1= JTC) were then carried out to allow for
analyses with covariates. All hypothesis testing was
two-tailed.
Results
Demographics
The demographic details of the participants are sum-
marized in Table 1. Levels of persecutory delusion
were high as assessed using the PSYRATS and the
GPTS, with scores similar to those in other samples
selected for current persecutory delusions (e.g. Foster
et al. 2010). Hallucinations were common, with 75 of
the patients scoring four or above on the PANSS hal-
lucination item. Only seven patients scored four or
above on the PANSS grandiosity item.
JTC
The mean number of beads drawn on the 60:40 task
was 7.6 (S.D.=5.9). This is comparable with that found
in the study of Garety et al. (2013) who reported a
mean of 7.2 (S.D.=5.7) (n=126). In the current study
30 patients (24.4%) with persecutory delusions jumped
Table 1. Basic demographic and clinical information
Persecutory delusions
group (n=123)
Mean age, years (S.D.) 40.6 (11.2)
Sex, n
Male 73
Female 50
Ethnicity, n
White 113
Black Caribbean 0
Black African 0
Black other 0
Indian 3
Pakistani 0
Chinese 0
Other 7
Diagnosis, n
Schizophrenia 87
Schizo-affective disorder 10
Delusional disorder 10
Psychosis NOS 16
Neuroleptic medication
(chlorpromazine equivalents), n
None 7
Low (1–200mg) 37
Medium (201–400mg) 27
High (>400mg) 51
Mean PSYRATS-delusions score (S.D.) 18.3 (3.1)
Mean PANSS total score (S.D.) 79.8 (13.5)
Mean GPTS – part A score (S.D.) 51.2 (13.7)
Mean GPTS – part B score (S.D.) 51.0 (13.9)
Mean total GPTS score (S.D.) 102.1 (25.2)
Mean IQ score (S.D.) 99.4 (18.4)
S.D., Standard deviation; NOS, not otherwise speciﬁed;
PSYRATS, Psychotic Symptom Rating Scales; PANSS,
Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale; GPTS, Green et al.
Paranoid Thoughts Scale; IQ, intelligence quotient.
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to conclusions. Again, this rate of JTC is comparable
with that found in the study of Garety et al. (2013)
(27% showing JTC), but it is lower than that reported
by So et al. (2012) (40%) (n=184). There were no differ-
ences between those who jumped to conclusions and
those who did not in levels of paranoia (GPTS total;
t120=0.642, p=0.522), severity of the persecutory delu-
sions (PSYRATS total; t121=0.018, p=0.986), the pres-
ence of hallucinations (PANSS hallucinations item;
t121=−0.263, p=0.793) or in overall psychopathology
(PANSS total; t121=−1.028, p=0.306). However, the
patients who showed JTC did have higher levels of
negative symptoms (PANSS negative; t121=−2.227,
p=0.028).
Neuropsychological functioning and JTC
Those patients who jumped to conclusions, compared
with those who did not, showed poorer working
memory performance and had lower IQ scores (see
Table 2). IQ scores correlated with forward digit
span (r=0.36, p<0.001), backward digit span (r=0.50,
p<0.001) and letter–number sequencing (r=0.55,
p<0.001). Letter–numbering sequencing showed the
strongest association with JTC. In a binary logistic re-
gression predicting JTC, when letter–number sequen-
cing and IQ were entered together as independent
variables they both became non-signiﬁcant predictors
(p>0.1). The presence of negative symptoms negatively
correlated with forward digit span (r=−0.14, p=0.129),
backward digit span (r=−0.24, p=0.008), letter–
number sequencing (r=−0.24, p=0.009) and IQ scores
(r=−0.37, p<0.001). In a binary logistic regression
predicting JTC, letter–number sequencing remained a
signiﬁcant predictor (p=0.020), but negative symptoms
did not (p=0.095).
Intolerance of uncertainty and JTC
The total delusion group’s mean IUS score of 88.4
(S.D.=24.1) was high. For example, Buhr & Dugas
(2002) reported a mean score in a non-clinical popu-
lation (n=273) of 54.8 (S.D. =17.4), and Norton (2005)
reported a mean score in a non-clinical population
(n=540) of 54.9 (S.D.=18.7). Dudley et al. (2011)
reported a mean score of 65.2 (S.D. =24.6) in patients
seen in a ﬁrst-episode psychosis service (n=77). The
scores of the patients with persecutory delusions are
closer to those of a generalized anxiety disorder
group. For example, van der Heiden et al. (2012)
reported a mean IUS score of 82.3 (S.D.=21.1) in a
generalized anxiety disorder group (n=42). There
was no difference in the current study in IUS scores
between patients with and without hallucinations
(t119=−1.037, p=0.302).
Those patients who jumped to conclusions, com-
pared with those who did not, showed lower levels
of intolerance of uncertainty, although this was only
statistically signiﬁcant for the presence of inﬂexible
certainty beliefs (see Table 3). Patients with JTC also
reported signiﬁcantly lower levels of worry, but no
differences in anxiety or repetitive negative thinking.
Worry positively correlated with total IUS scores
(r=0.49, p<0.001). When total IUS score was entered
with worry as independent variables in a binary
logistic regression, there was a trend for worry scores
to predict JTC (B=−0.055, odds ratio (OR) 0.95,
p=0.067), but IUS scores did not predict JTC
(B=−0.008, OR 0.99, p=0.450). A similar pattern was
found for the IUS inﬂexible certainty beliefs score.
In a binary logistic regression predicting JTC, there
were indications that worry was a predictor
(B=−0.051, OR 0.95, p=0.078), but the IUS certainty
beliefs did not predict JTC (B=−0.073, OR 0.93,
p=0.213).
Working memory, worry and JTC
There were no signiﬁcant correlations between worry
and the working memory tasks (all p>0.1). In a binary
logistic regression with JTC as the dependent variable,
and letter–number sequencing and worry as the inde-
pendent variables, both poorer working memory
(B=−0.229, OR 0.80, p=0.002) and lower levels of
worry (B=−0.082, OR 0.922, p=0.005) predicted JTC.
Similarly, in a binary logistic regression, JTC was
predicted by both lower IQ (B=−0.037, OR 0.963,
Table 2. Neuropsychological functioning and JTC
JTC: mean (S.D.) No JTC: mean (S.D.) Mean difference (95% CI) p
Forward digit span 8.9 (1.8) 9.8 (2.5) 0.9 (0.1–1.8) 0.033
Backward digit span 5.0 (2.1) 6.2 (2.1) 1.2 (0.3–2.0) 0.013
Letter–number sequencing 6.8 (3.5) 8.9 (3.1) 2.1 (0.7–3.5) 0.003
IQ 91.4 (16.8) 102.0 (18.3) 10.6 (3.2–18.1) 0.006
JTC, Jumping to conclusions; S.D., standard deviation; CI, conﬁdence interval; IQ, intelligence quotient.
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p=0.004) and lower levels of worry (B=−0.076, OR
0.927, p=0.007). When letter–number sequencing,
IQ and worry were simultaneously entered as inde-
pendent variables, JTC was predicted by worry
(B=−0.083, OR 0.921, p=0.005), but not signiﬁcantly
by working memory (B=−0.160, OR 0.853, p=0.070)
or IQ (B=−0.022, OR 0.978, p=0.149).
Discussion
Two potential contributors to the JTC reasoning style
were examined within a large group of patients with
current persecutory delusions. JTC was considered in
relation to basic information-processing capacity prob-
lems and motivational beliefs concerning uncertainty.
It is the former contributor for which the most conﬁ-
dent conclusions can be drawn. Given the similar
ﬁndings of the large studies of Garety et al. (2013)
and Falcone (2013), we can now be conﬁdent of an
association of JTC with working memory. Arguably,
studies such as that of Ormrod et al. (2012) failed to
ﬁnd such an association because of a small sample
size. The working memory impairment was associated
with levels of current intellectual functioning (and
these were not separable predictors of JTC). Keeping
alternative explanations in mind, gathering data, and
weighing the evidence all have plausible memory
load; pursuing one explanation, gathering conﬁrma-
tory evidence, and reaching a deﬁnitive conclusion
are likely to reduce demands on memory. Working
memory difﬁculties via the reasoning strategies that
they provoke are likely to be a factor in the persistence
of delusional beliefs.
Levels of intolerance of uncertainty in the patients
with persecutory delusions were high, consistent
with the presence of worry in this group at a level
comparable with patients with anxiety disorders.
A number of studies have now identiﬁed high levels
of worry in patients with persecutory delusions
(e.g. Freeman & Garety, 1999; Startup et al. 2007;
Bassett et al. 2009; Freeman et al. 2010). Against predic-
tion, however, IUS scores were slightly higher in the
patients with delusions who did not jump to conclu-
sions compared with the patients who did jump to
conclusions. Greater intolerance of uncertainty was
clearly not associated with JTC, consistent with the
study of Dudley et al. (2011). As originally proposed
by Freeston et al. (1994), intolerance of uncertainty
may, at least within a clinical psychosis sample,
lead to greater information search before certainty.
However, the levels of worry in the group may well
explain the association. Caution is needed about
over-interpreting this result before replication. This is
especially the case since: there was no association
with the occurrence of general repetitive negative
thinking; an experimental study with patients with
persecutory delusions showed no change in JTC in
the period after a bout of worry (Freeman et al. 2013);
and there is little evidence that anxiety disorder groups
seek more data during the beads task relative to
non-clinical controls (e.g. Jacobsen et al. 2012). The
study provides little evidence that one form of
motivational belief – intolerance of uncertainty – is a
factor in JTC.
The key weakness of the study design is that it only
identiﬁes factors associated with JTC. An unmeasured
variable may better explain the occurrence of JTC.
Testing of causal roles is needed, for example, by
manipulating working memory performance during
data gathering. The group had persistent persecutory
delusions, and therefore testing of different delusion
types and stages of illness could result in different
results. Relationships with other symptom types re-
main to be established; for example, in the current
study there was an association of JTC with negative
symptoms, but this was not found in the study of
Garety et al. (2013). There are also other factors that
could moderate the extent of data gathering, for exam-
ple, a reliance on experiential reasoning (Freeman
et al. 2012b). As the work is taken forward there will
Table 3. Intolerance of uncertainty and JTC
JTC: mean (S.D.) No JTC: mean (S.D.) Mean difference (95% CI) p
IUS total 81.6 (22.2) 90.6 (24.4) 9.1 (−0.9 to 19.0) 0.074
Desire for predictability 21.5 (23.9) 23.9 (6.9) 2.4 (−0.4 to 5.3) 0.088
Uncertainty paralysis 18.4 (5.6) 20.2 (6.0) 1.8 (−0.7 to 4.2) 0.159
Uncertainty distress 16.5 (4.5) 17.3 (5.0) 0.8 (−1.3 to 2.8) 0.453
Inﬂexible certainty beliefs 10.1 (3.4) 11.9 (4.3) 1.8 (0.1 to 3.5) 0.036
Anxiety 24.9 (11.1) 26.4 (14.9) 1.5 (−3.6 to 6.6) 0.565
Worry 60.7 (8.4) 64.8 (7.6) 4.2 (0.9 to 7.4) 0.012
Perseverative thoughts 44.0 (9.5) 44.6 (9.6) 0.6 (−3.4 to 4.7) 0.757
JTC, Jumping to conclusions; S.D., standard deviation; CI, conﬁdence interval; IUS, Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale.
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ideally be investigation of data gathering directly in
relation to delusional ideas, and hence study of par-
ticular reasoning styles that can enhance recovery
from persecutory delusions. A greater understanding
of the reasoning processes that lead to erroneous
beliefs becoming corrected is a clear priority for the
development of a new generation of interventions for
delusions.
Acknowledgements
The study was supported by a grant (no. 09/160/06)
from the Efﬁcacy and Mechanism Evaluation (EME)
Programme, which is funded by the UK Medical
Research Council and the UK NHS National Institute
for Health Research. D.F. is supported by a UK
Medical Research Council Senior Clinical Fellowship.
Declaration of Interest
None.
References
Bassett M, Sperlinger D, Freeman D (2009). Fear of madness
and persecutory delusions. Psychosis 1, 39–50.
Berenbaum H, Bredemeier K, Thompson R (2008).
Intolerance of uncertainty: exploring its dimensionality and
associations with need for cognitive closure,
psychopathology, and personality. Journal of Anxiety
Disorders 22, 117–125.
Broome M, Johns L, Valli I, Woolley J, Tabraham P, Brett C,
Valmaggia L, Peters E, Garety P, McGuire P (2007).
Delusion formation and reasoning biases in those at clinical
high risk for psychosis. British Journal of Psychiatry 191,
s38–s42.
Buhr K, Dugas M (2002). The Intolerance of Uncertainty
Scale: psychometric properties of the English version.
Behaviour Research and Therapy 40, 931–945.
Dudley R, Daley K, Nicholson M, Shaftoe D, Spencer H,
Cavanagh K, Freeston M (2013). Jumping to conclusions in
ﬁrst-episode psychosis: a longitudinal study. British Journal
of Clinical Psychology 52, 380–393.
Dudley R, John C, Young A, Over D (1997). Normal and
abnormal reasoning in people with delusions. British Journal
of Clinical Psychology 36, 243–258.
Dudley R, Shaftoe D, Cavanagh K, Spencer H, Ormrod J,
Turkington D, Freeston M (2011). ‘Jumping to conclusions’
in ﬁrst-episode psychosis. Early Intervention in Psychiatry 5,
50–56.
Dugas M, Gagnon F, Ladouceur R, Freeston M (1998).
Generalised anxiety disorder: a preliminary test of a
conceptual model. Behaviour Research and Therapy 36,
215–226.
Ehring T, Zetsche U, Weidacker K, Wahl K, Schönfeld S,
Ehlers A (2011). The Perseverative Thinking Questionnaire
(PTQ): validation of a content-independent measure of
repetitive negative thinking. Journal of Behaviour Therapy and
Experimental Psychiatry 42, 225–232.
Falcone A (2013). Neuropsychological and symptom
correlates of the jumping to conclusions reasoning bias.
PhD thesis. King’s College London: London.
Foster C, Startup H, Potts L, Freeman D (2010).
A randomised controlled trial of a worry intervention
for individuals with persistent persecutory delusions.
Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry 41,
45–51.
Freeman D, Dunn G, Startup H, Kingdon D (2012a). The
effects of reducing worry in patients with persecutory
delusions: study protocol for a randomized controlled trial.
Trials 13, 223.
Freeman D, Evans N, Lister R (2012b). Gut feelings,
deliberative thought, and paranoid ideation. Psychiatry
Research 197, 119–122.
Freeman D, Garety PA (1999). Worry, worry processes and
dimensions of delusions. Behavioural and Cognitive
Psychotherapy 27, 47–62.
Freeman D, Garety PA (2000). Comments on the content of
persecutory delusions: does the deﬁnition need
clariﬁcation? British Journal of Clinical Psychology 39,
407–414.
Freeman D, Garety PA, Kuipers E, Colbert S, Jolley S,
Fowler D, Dunn G, Bebbington PE (2006). Delusions and
decision-making style: use of the Need for Closure Scale.
Behaviour Research and Therapy 44, 1147–1158.
Freeman D, Pugh K, Vorontsova N, Antley A, Slater M
(2010). Testing the continuum of delusional beliefs: an
experimental study using virtual reality. Journal of Abnormal
Psychology 119, 83–92.
Freeman D, Startup H, Dunn G, Černis E, Wingham G,
Pugh K, Cordwell J, Kingdon D (2013). The interaction of
affective with psychotic processes: a test of the effects of
worrying on working memory, jumping to conclusions,
and anomalies of experience in patients with persecutory
delusions. Journal of Psychiatric Research 47, 1837–1842.
Freeston M, Rhéaume J, Letarte H, Dugas M, Ladouceur R
(1994). Why do people worry? Personality and Individual
Differences 17, 791–802.
Garety P, Freeman D (1999). Cognitive approaches to
delusions: a critical review of theories and evidence. British
Journal of Clinical Psychology 38, 113–154.
Garety P, Freeman D (2013). The past and future of delusion
research: from the inexplicable to the treatable. British
Journal of Psychiatry 203, 327–333.
Garety PA, Freeman D, Jolley S, Dunn G, Bebbington PE,
Fowler D, Kuipers E, Dudley R (2005). Reasoning,
emotions and delusional conviction in psychosis. Journal of
Abnormal Psychology 114, 373–384.
Garety P, Joyce E, Jolley S, Emsley R, Waller H, Kuipers E,
Bebbington P, Fowler D, Dunn G, Freeman D (2013).
Neuropsychological functioning and jumping to
conclusions in delusions. Schizophrenia Research 150,
570–574.
Garety P, Hemsley D, Wessely S (1991). Reasoning in
deluded schizophrenic and paranoid patients: biases in
Jumping to conclusions in patients with persecutory delusions 7
performance on a probabilistic inference task. Journal of
Nervous and Mental Disease 179, 194–201.
Green C, Freeman D, Kuipers E, Bebbington P, Fowler D,
Dunn G, Garety P (2008). Measuring ideas of persecution
and social reference. Psychological Medicine 38, 101–111.
Haddock G, McCarron J, Tarrier N, Faragher FB (1999).
Scales to measure dimensions of hallucinations and
delusions: the Psychotic Symptom Rating Scales
(PSYRATS). Psychological Medicine 29, 879–889.
Jacobsen P, Freeman D, Salkovskis P (2012). Reasoning bias
and belief conviction in obsessive–compulsive disorder and
delusions. British Journal of Clinical Psychology 51, 84–99.
Kay SR (1991). Positive and Negative Syndromes in
Schizophrenia. Brunner: New York.
Kruglanski A, Webster D (1996). Motivated closing of the
mind. Psychological Review 103, 263–283.
Lincoln T, Ziegler M, Mehl S, Rief W (2010). The jumping to
conclusions bias in delusions. Journal of Abnormal Psychology
119, 40–49.
Menon M, Mizrahi R, Kapur S (2008). Jumping to
conclusions and delusions in psychosis: relationship and
response to treatment. Schizophrenia Research 98, 225–231.
Menon M, Pomarol-Clotet E, McKenna P, McCarthy R
(2006). Probabilistic reasoning in schizophrenia: a
comparison of the performance of deluded and nondeluded
schizophrenic patients and exploration of possible cognitive
underpinnings. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry 11, 521–536.
Meyer TJ, Miller ML, Metzger RL, Borkovec TD (1990).
Development and validation of the Penn State Worry
Questionnaire. Behaviour Research and Therapy 28, 487–495.
Moritz S, Vitzthum F, Randjbar S, Veckenstedt R,
Woodward TS (2010). Detecting and defusing cognitive
traps: metacognitive intervention in schizophrenia. Current
Opinion in Psychiatry 23, 561–569.
Norton P (2005). A psychometric analysis of the Intolerance of
Uncertainty Scale among four racial groups. Journal of
Anxiety Disorders 19, 699–707.
Nuechterlein K, Barch D, Gold J, Goldberg T, Green M,
Heaton R (2004). Identiﬁcation of separable cognitive
factors in schizophrenia. Schizophrenia Research 72, 29–39.
Ormrod J, Shaftoe D, Cavanagh K, Freeston M,
Turkington D, Price J, Dudley R (2012). A pilot study
exploring the contribution of working memory to “jumping
to conclusions” in people with ﬁrst episode psychosis.
Cognitive Neuropsychiatry 17, 97–114.
So S, Freeman D, Dunn G, Kapur S, Kuipers E,
Bebbington P, Fowler D, Garety P (2012). Jumping to
conclusions, a lack of belief ﬂexibility and delusional
conviction in psychosis. Journal of Abnormal Psychology 121,
129–139.
Startup HM, Erickson TM (2006). The Penn State Worry
Questionnaire (PSWQ). In Worry and its Psychological
Disorders (ed. G. C. L. Davey and A. Wells), pp. 101–120.
Wiley: Chichester.
Startup H, Freeman D, Garety PA (2007). Persecutory
delusions and catastrophic worry in psychosis: developing
the understanding of delusion distress and persistence.
Behaviour Research and Therapy 45, 523–537.
Sternheim L, Startup H, Schmidt U (2011). An experimental
exploration of behavioural and cognitive–emotional aspects
of intolerance of uncertainty in eating disorder patients.
Journal of Anxiety Disorders 25, 806–812.
van der Heiden C, Muris P, van de Molen H (2012).
Randomized controlled trial on the effectiveness of
intolerance-of-uncertainty therapy for generalized
anxiety disorder. Behaviour Research and Therapy 50,
100–109.
Ventura J, Hellemann G, Thames A, Koellner V,
Nuechterlein K (2009). Symptoms as mediators of the
relationship between neurocognition and functional
outcome in schizophrenia: a meta-analysis. Schizophrenia
Research 113, 189–199.
Waller H, Freeman D, Jolley S, Dunn G, Garety P (2011).
Targeting reasoning biases in delusions. Journal of Behavior
Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry 42, 414–421.
Warman D, Lysaker P, Martin J, Davis L, Haudenschield S
(2007). Jumping to conclusions and the continuum of
delusional beliefs. Behaviour Research and Therapy 45,
1255–1269.
Wechsler D (1997). Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, 3rd edn.
The Psychological Corporation: San Antonio, TX.
Wechsler D (1999). Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence
(WASI). The Psychological Corporation: San Antonio, TX.
Wechsler D (2001). Wechsler Test of Adult Reading (WTAR).
The Psychological Corporation: San Antonio, TX.
Woodward TS, Mizrahi R, Menon M, Christensen BK
(2008). Correspondences between theory of mind, jumping
to conclusions, neuropsychological measures and the
symptoms of schizophrenia. Psychiatry Research 170,
119–123.
8 D. Freeman et al.
